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Abstract. In the setting of identity-based encryption with multiple
trusted authorities, TA anonymity formally models the inability of an ad-
versary to distinguish two ciphertexts corresponding to the same message
and identity, but generated using diﬀerent TA master public-keys. This
security property has applications in the prevention of traﬃc analysis in
coalition networking environments. In this paper, we examine the impli-
cations of TA anonymity for key-privacy for normal public-key encryp-
tion (PKE) schemes. Key-privacy for PKE captures the requirement that
ciphertexts should not leak any information about the public-keys used
to perform encryptions. Thus key-privacy guarantees recipient anonymity
for a PKE scheme. Canetti, Halevi and Katz (CHK) gave a generic trans-
form which constructs an IND-CCAsecure PKE scheme using an identity-
based encryption (IBE) scheme that is selective-id IND-CPA secure and a
strongly secure one-time signature scheme. Their transform works in the
standard model (i.e. does not require the use of random oracles). Here,
we prove that if the underlying IBE scheme in the CHK transform is TA
anonymous, then the resulting PKE scheme enjoys key-privacy. Whilst
IND-CCA secure, key-private PKE schemes are already known in the
standard-model, our result gives the ﬁrst generic method of construct-
ing a key-private PKE scheme in the standard model. We then go on to
investigate the TA anonymity of multi-TA versions of well-known stan-
dard model secure IBEschemes. In particular, we provetheTAanonymity
and selective-id IND-CPA security of a multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE
scheme. Applying the CHK transform, we obtain a new, eﬃcient key-
private, IND-CCA secure PKE scheme in the standard model.
Keywords: public-key encryption, key-privacy, identity-based encryp-
tion, multiple trusted authorities, TA anonymity, standard model.
1 Introduction
Building public-key encryption (PKE) schemes that are secure in a very strong
sense, satisfying indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks or
IND-CCA secure, remains a very active area of research. Only a handful of ap-
proaches [20,13,11] are known for constructing IND-CCA secure PKE schemes
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without resorting to the Random Oracle Model [3]. In the usual public-key set-
ting, the security notion termed key-privacy has also gained increasing impor-
tance in recent years, in the context of anonymous communications [2]. While
speciﬁc schemes such as ElGamal, Cramer-Shoup and RSA-based schemes are
known to be key-private [2], no generic method is known for constructing a
key-private PKE scheme.
Following the results of Cocks [12], and the pairing-based solutions of Sakai,
Ohigishiand Kasahara[22] andBoneh andFranklin [7], identity-basedcryptogra-
phy (IBC) [23] has become one of the most active areas of cryptographic research.
Canetti et al. [11] give a generic construction, now called the CHK transform, to
obtain an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme from an IBE scheme that is selective-id
IND-CPA secure, and a strong one time signature scheme. No mention is made in
[11] of the key-privacy of the PKE schemes arising from the CHK transform.
In the world of identity-based encryption (IBE), the setting of multiple trusted
authorities has recently been treated rigorously [21]. In this setting, the relatively
new security property termed trusted authority (TA) anonymity captures the in-
ability of an adversary to distinguish two ciphertexts corresponding to the same
message and identity, but generated using diﬀerent TA master public-keys. At a
high level, in this paper, we provethat a key-privatePKE scheme is obtained from
theCHKtransformiftheunderlyingIBEschemehasaweakformofTAanonymity.
OurresultgivestheﬁrstgenericmethodforconstructingaPKEschemeinthestan-
dard model that is both key-private and IND-CCA secure.
Based on our current results, we argue that the relatively new notion of TA
anonymity is not only of interest in the area of anonymous communications, for
example in thwarting traﬃcanalysis[21], but alsohas rathersubtle cryptographic
implications for schemes that use IBE as a building block. It therefore merits fur-
ther study. We investigate the TA anonymity of multi-TA versions of well-known
IBEschemesinthe standardmodel andweareeasilyabletoshowthat they donot
satisfy the notion ofTA anonymity.By contrast,we provethat a multi-TA version
of Gentry’s IBE scheme [15] is TA anonymous. Instantiating the CHK transform
with this multi-TA Gentry scheme gives us a concrete and reasonably eﬃcient
key-private, IND-CCA secure PKE scheme in the standard model.
2 Background
Anonymous encryption was historically motivated in the context of mobile com-
munication. In the standard public-key setting, entities A and B exchange en-
crypted messages using each others’ public-keys, over a broadcast medium, where
eavesdroppers can see all ciphertexts on the network. It is reasonable to assume
that A and B will want to keep their identities hidden from such eavesdroppers
and this is possible only when ciphertexts do not leak information about the
public-keys used to create them, a notion formalized as key-privacy in [2].
In almost all the existing literature on IBE, with a small number of exceptions,
thereisasingleTAthatissueskeystoalltheusersinthesystem,andallciphertexts
are created using the public parameters of that single TA. This TA is also known
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identity-based setting, the notions of security roughly equivalent to the IND-CPA
and IND-CCA security notions for PKE were ﬁrst formalized in [7]. In the IND-
CPA and IND-CCA games for IBE, the adversary is also given access to a private
key extraction oracle with suitable restrictions on its use.
In IBE, the security notion equivalent to key-privacy in PKE is termed re-
cipient anonymity. The systematic study of recipient anonymity was initiated
in [1], motivated both by its intrinsic interest in IBE and for its application in
constructing public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) schemes. Re-
cipient anonymity models the requirement that ciphertexts should not leak the
identity of their intended recipients.
It is possible to envisage scenarios with multiple, independent TAs perhaps
sharing some common system parameters. The systematic study of security of
IBE in this multi-TA setting was initiated in [21]. In such a setting, in addition to
the usual IBE security notions of indistinguishability and recipient anonymity,
the notion of TA anonymity arises naturally. TA anonymity captures the re-
quirement that an adversary should ﬁnd it diﬃcult to distinguish ciphertexts
produced using diﬀerent TA master public-keys, even if the ciphertext is for
the same message and identity string. TA anonymity has practical signiﬁcance,
again in the context of anonymous communications. For example, if a coalition
of TAs operate in a wireless setting where all ciphertexts can be captured from
the network by an adversary, and if the ciphertext were to somehow leak the
identity of the TA, this would open up avenues for traﬃc analysis [21]. However,
the cryptographic implications of TA anonymity for schemes that use IBE as a
building block have as yet not been studied.
3 Our Contributions
We consider the CHK transform in the setting of multiple public keys that is
needed when studying key-privacy. This quite naturally gives rise to a multi-TA
IBE setting of the type considered in [21]. We show how to modify the CHK
construction to reﬂect this setting. We then prove that the key-privacy of the
PKE scheme resulting from our modiﬁed CHK transform follows from a weak
form of TA anonymity for the underlying multi-TA IBE scheme. Our result gives
us the ﬁrst generic method of constructing a PKE scheme in the standard model
that is key-private, as well as being IND-CCA secure.
We note that the transform of Boneh and Katz [8] builds on the ideas of [11]
to give a more eﬃcient construction of PKE from IBE. We can prove similar
results for the Boneh-Katz transform. (The results from both [11,8] appear in
[6].) Due to constraints of space and bearing in mind that the proof of security
in [8] is more involved and that the our aim in this paper has been to highlight
the signiﬁcance of TA anonymity, especially with relation to building key-private
PKE schemes, we have limited our discussions to the original CHK transform.
To obtain concrete PKE schemes that are key-private and IND-CCA se-
cure, we study the TA anonymity properties of multi-TA versions of the known
standard-model IND-CPA secure IBE schemes. We are able to prove that a
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able to show that multi-TA versions of the two popular standard model schemes
of Boneh and Boyen in [5], termed BB1 and BB2 in the literature, and multi-TA
versions of the schemes related to the BB1 scheme, such as those of Waters [24]
and Naccache [19], trivially do not meet the notion of TA anonymity.
4 Deﬁnitions
In this section, we provide basic deﬁnitions needed for the remainder of the
paper. Here, we omit standard deﬁnitions for PKE, IBE and strongly secure
one-time signatures which can be found in the full version of this paper or for
example in [6].
Deﬁnition 1. A pairing-friendly group generator PairingGen is a polynomial
time algorithm with input 1k and output a tuple (G,GT,e,p,g).H e r eG,GT are
groups of prime order p, g generates G,a n de : G × G → GT is a bilinear,
non-degenerate and eﬃciently computable map.
For ease of presentation, we work exclusively in the setting where e is symmetric;
our deﬁnitions and results can be generalised to the asymmetric setting where e :
G1×G2 → GT,w i t hG1 and G2 being diﬀerent groups. Further details concerning
the basic choices that are available when using pairings in cryptography can be
found in [14].
Deﬁnition 2. We deﬁne the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the Trun-
cated Decisional  -Augmented Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Exponent ( -TDABDHE)
problem in (G,GT) to be:
Adv -TDABDHE
A (k)=|Pr(A(g
 ,g
 
(l+2),g 1,g 2,...,g l,e(g(l+1),g
 )) = 1)
−Pr(A(g ,g 
(l+2),g 1,g 2,...,g l,Z)=1 ) |
where α
$ ← Z∗
p, Z
$ ← GT, g  $ ← G, gi = g(α
i) and g 
i = g (α
i). Here, we implicitly
assume that parameters (G,GT,e,p,g) are given to A as additional inputs. The
distribution on the left is referred to as PABDHE and that on the right is referred
to as RABDHE.
We note that this is the same assumption that is used to prove the security of
the IBE scheme presented in [15].
Deﬁnition 3. We say that the (t, , )-TDABDHE problem is hard in (G,GT) if
no t-time algorithm has advantage at least   in solving the  -TDABDHE problem
in (G,GT).
Deﬁnition 4. Af u n c t i o n (k) is said to be negligible if, for every c,t h e r ee x i s t s
kc such that  (k) ≤ k−c for every k ≥ kc.
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– CommonSetup: On input 1k, outputs params, a set of system parameters
shared by all TAs; T = {tai :1≤ i ≤ n} will represent the set of (labels of)
TAs, where n = n(k) ∈ N.
– TASetup: On input params, outputs a master public-key mpk (which includes
params), and a master secret key msk. This algorithm is randomized and
executed independently for each TA in T .
– KeyDer, Enc, Dec: These are all as per a normal IBE scheme.
Following the reasoning in [21] we note that for the concrete schemes and
transforms considered in this paper, common parameters are needed in order
to achieve the notion of TA anonymity; doing so without having some (non-
trivial) common parameters is an interesting open problem. We note that it
is not unreasonable to assume that the diﬀerent TAs may share some common
system parameters (e.g. the output of a pairing parameter generator) [21]. In fact
the possibility of TAs sharing parameters becomes much more likely when we
consider the greater complexity of setting up an IBE scheme (where consideration
has to be given, among other things, to the choice of elliptic curves, groups
used in Pairings, the representation of elements etc.) compared to the “relative
simplicity” of setting up, say an RSA scheme. The IEEE P1363.3 working group
aims to produce a set of standards speciﬁc to identity-based cryptography to
address these diﬃculties. Indeed, sharing of common parameters is inevitable
if any kind of interoperability is desired between TAs and such scenarios are
becoming more and more desirable [4].
5.1 Security Models for Multi-TA IBE
In all the security games that follow, we associate to an adversary A and a bit
b ∈{ 0,1}, the advantage of the adversary for a “notion-attack” combination,
which is deﬁned to be:
Advnotion-atk-b
A (k)=


Pr[Expnotion-atk-1
A (k)=1 ]− Pr[Expnotion-atk-0
A (k)=1 ]


.
A scheme is said to be “notion-atk”-secure if the advantage of all PPT adver-
saries is negligible as a function of the security parameter k.
We detail the m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA experiment as deﬁned in [21] that si-
multaneously captures message indistinguishability, recipient anonymity and TA
anonymity in the multi-TA IBE setting, against chosen ciphertext adversaries.
This model also gives the adversary access to a Corrupt oracle that returns the
master secret key for a TA of the adversary’s choice.
In the security game deﬁned below, TASet represents the set of TAs that have
been corrupted, i.e. queried for their master secret keys, IDSetta represents
the set of identities queried for private keys for each ta ∈T , while CSetta
represents the set of identity/ciphertext pairs on which decryption queries have
been performed for each ta ∈T. In these games, MPK = {mpkta : ta ∈T}and
MSK = {mskta : ta ∈T}represent the set of all master public-keys and all
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Experiment Expm-IND-RA-TAA-CCA-b
A (k)
params ← CommonSetup(1
k)
TASet ←∅
∀ta ∈T,( mpkta,mskta) ← TASetup(params),
IDSetta ←∅and CSetta ←∅
(ta0,ta1,id0,id1,m0,m1,state) ←
ACorrupt,KeyDer,Dec(find,MPK)
c
∗ ← Enc(mpktab,idb,mb)
b
  ←A Corrupt,KeyDer,Dec(guess,c
∗,state)
If {m0,m1}   MsgSp or |m0|  = |m1|
then Return 0
If (ta0 = ta1 and id0 = id1 and m0 = m1)
then Return 0
If ta0 / ∈ TASet, ta1 / ∈ TASet, id0 / ∈ IDSetta0,
id1 / ∈ IDSetta1,( id0,c
∗) / ∈ CSetta0 and (id1,c
∗) / ∈
CSetta1 then Return b
  else Return 0
Oracle Corrupt(ta)
TASet ← TASet ∪{ ta}
Return mskta
Oracle KeyDer(ta,id)
IDSetta ← IDSetta ∪{ id}
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
Return uskid,ta
Oracle Dec(ta,id,c)
CSetta ← CSetta ∪{ (id,c)}
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
m ← Dec(mpkta,uskid,ta,c)
Return m
By placing suitable restrictions on the m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA security notion,
we can deﬁne other, weaker security notions appropriate to the multi-TA IBE
setting. For example, CPA secure versions can be deﬁned by removing the ad-
versary’s access to the decryption oracle. By removing the adversary’s access to
the Corrupt oracle we deﬁne “restricted” versions, and appropriate selective-id
versions can be deﬁned by having the adversary commit ahead of time to the
identities used in the challenge query. Furthermore, setting m0 = m1, id0 = id1
or ta0 = ta1 gives security notions appropriate to speciﬁc circumstances. We will
elaborate on some of these security models as we encounter them in this paper.
6 Key-Privacy of the CHK Transform
Canetti et al. [11] give a construction that builds an IND-CCA secure PKE
scheme from a selective-id IND-CPA secure IBE scheme and a strongly secure
one-time signature scheme.
We ﬁrst describe a security notion for PKE which we term IND-IK-CCA and
which simultaneously captures message indistinguishability and key-privacy. We
then deﬁne the selective-id r-m-IND-TAA-CPA security notion for IBE, this
being a weakened version of the m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA notion deﬁned above.
We then modify the CHK construction from [11] to reﬂect the setting of mul-
tiple users. Finally we show that the IND-IK-CCA security of the public-key
encryption scheme built using the (modiﬁed) CHK transform follows from the
selective-id r-m-IND-TAA-CPA security of the underlying IBE scheme.
We note that we do not require recipient anonymity of the IBE scheme to ob-
tain our result. Rather, the security property needed from the IBE scheme is the
form TA anonymity which is captured in our selective-id r-m-IND-TAA-CPA se-
curity notion. In section 7.1 we will prove that a multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE
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for the application of our result. Instantiating the CHK transform with the multi-
TA Gentry scheme and any strongly secure one-time signature scheme will give us
a concrete construction of a key-private and IND-CCA secure PKE scheme.
6.1 IND-IK-CCA Security for PKE
Bellare et al. [2] deﬁne two notions, IK-CPA and IK-CCA security, that cap-
ture the notions of key-privacy under chosen plaintext attacks and chosen ci-
phertext attacks, respectively. For our purposes, we deﬁne a combined security
notion which simultaneously captures both message indistinguishability and key-
privacy. We term this IND-IK-CCA security.
Experiment ExpIND-IK-CCA-b
A (k)
I
$ ← CommonSetup(1
k)
(PK 0,SK 0)
$ ← KeyGen(I)
(PK 1,SK 1)
$ ← KeyGen(I)
CSetSK 0 ←∅ , CSetSK 1 ←∅
(m0,m1,state) ←A Dec(find,PK 0,PK 1)
c
∗ ← Enc(PK b,mb)
b
  ←A Dec(guess,c
∗,state)
If |m0|  = |m1| or m0 = m1 then Return 0
If c
∗ / ∈ CSetSK 0 and c
∗ / ∈ CSetSK 1
then Return b
  else Return 0
Oracle Dec(PK b,c)
CSetSK b ← CSetSK b ∪{ c}
m ← Dec(SK b,c)
Return m
6.2 Security for Multi-TA IBE
We deﬁne the selective-id r-m-IND-TAA-CPA security notion for multi-TA IBE.
A single identity is used in the challenge phase in this model, i.e. id0 = id1.
Furthermore, the adversary commits to this identity at the start of the game.
The adversary is not allowed to make decryption or Corrupt queries.
Experiment Exps-id r-m-IND-TAA-CPA-b
A (k)
id
∗ ←A (1
k)
params ← CommonSetup(1
k)
TASet ←∅
∀ta ∈T,( mpkta,mskta) ← TASetup(params),
IDSetta ←∅
(ta0,ta1,m0,m1,state) ←
AKeyDer(find,MPK)
c
∗ ← Enc(mpktab,id
∗,mb)
b
  ←A KeyDer(guess,c
∗,state)
If {m0,m1}   MsgSp or |m0|  = |m1| or m0 = m1
then Return 0
If ta0 = ta1 then Return 0
If ta0 / ∈ TASet, ta1 / ∈ TASet, id
∗ / ∈ IDSetta0,
id
∗ / ∈ IDSetta1 then Return b
  else Return 0
Oracle KeyDer(ta,id)
IDSetta ← IDSetta ∪{ id}
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
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6.3 The Modiﬁed CHK Transform
Let Π  = {CommonSetup ,TASetup,KeyDer,Enc ,Dec } be a multi-TA IBE
scheme for identities of length n.
Let Sig = {Gen,Sgn,Vrfy} be a one-time signature scheme in which the
veriﬁcation keys output by Gen have length n.
Deﬁne Π = {CommonSetup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec} as follows
– CommonSetup: Runs CommonSetup  to obtain params.
– KeyGen: Runs TASetup to obtain mpk,msk. The public-key is PK = mpk
(PK includes params,a smpk by deﬁnition includes params) and the secret
key is SK = msk.
– Enc: To encrypt a message m using public-key PK, the sender ﬁrst runs Gen
to obtain a veriﬁcation key vk and the corresponding signing key sk (with
|vk| = n). Then, the sender computes c = Enc(PK,m)=Enc (mpk,vk,m)
(i.e. the sender encrypts the message m with respect to identity vk for recip-
ient with public-key PK = mpk )a n dσ = Sgn(sk,c). The ﬁnal ciphertext
is (vk,c,σ).
– Dec: To decrypt (vk,c,σ) using the secret key msk, the recipient ﬁrst checks
whether Vrfy(vk,c,σ)
? = 1. If not, the receiver outputs ⊥.O t h e r w i s e ,t h e
receiver computes uskvk = KeyDer(msk,vk) and outputs m = Dec(SK,c)=
Dec (mpk,uskvk,c).
Theorem 1. If Π  is an IBE scheme which is selective-id r-m-IND-TAA-CPA
secure and Sig is a strongly secure one-time signature scheme, then Π is an
IND-IK-CCA secure PKE scheme.
Proof. Our proof follows closely the proof of [11] with suitable modiﬁcations to
reﬂect the setting of multiple users. In the following, expressions of the form
PrA,S[Event] denote the probability that an Event occurs when an adversary A
interacts with a scheme S in a speciﬁed security game.
Let A be an IND-IK-CCA adversary against Π. We say a ciphertext (vk,c,σ)
is valid if Vrfy(vk,c,σ)=1 .L e t( vk
∗,c ∗,σ∗) denote the challenge ciphertext
received by A during a particular run of the experiment and let Forge denote
the event that A submits a valid ciphertext (vk
∗,c,σ) to its decryption oracle.
Claim 1: PrA,Π[Forge] is negligible.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 :A is an IND-IK-CCA adversary against the PKE scheme
Π.W eu s eA to construct an adversary F that forges a signature with respect
to the one-time signature scheme Sig , with probability PrA,Π[Forge].
F is given a veriﬁcation key vk. F ﬁrst runs KeyGen to obtain (PK 0,SK0)
and (PK 1,SK1). It gives A the two public-keys PK 0 and PK 1.N o t et h a tF can
answer any decryption queries of A.
If A happens to submit a valid ciphertext (vk
∗,c,σ) to its decryption oracle
before requesting the challenge ciphertext then F simply outputs the forgery
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Otherwise, when A outputs messages m0 and m1, it chooses a random bit
b and computes c∗ = Enc (mpkb,vk
∗,m b) and obtains from its signing oracle a
signature σ∗ on the message c∗, i.e. σ∗ = Sgn(sk,c ∗)w h e r esk is the signing key
corresponding to vk. F gives A the challenge ciphertext (vk
∗,c ∗,σ∗)
Subsequently, if A submits a valid ciphertext (vk
∗,c,σ) to its decryption or-
acle, (note that we must have (c,σ)  =( c∗,σ∗)) F simply outputs (c,σ)a si t s
forgery.
It is easy to see that F’s success probability is exactly PrA,Π[Forge].
Claim 2: |PrA,Π[Succ∧ Forge]+1
2 PrA,Π[Forge] − 1
2| is negligible.
Proof of Claim 2: We now use A to construct a selective-id r-m-IND-TAA-
CPA attacker B against the IBE scheme Π .
Adversary B acts as a Challenger for A as follows.
B runs Gen(1k)t oo b t a i n( sk
∗,vk
∗) and outputs a target identity id
∗ = vk
∗
to its Challenger C.
C gives B MPK, the set of all master public-keys in the multi-TA IBE scheme.
Adversary B gives A the two public-keys PK 0 = mpkta0 and PK 1 = mpkta1.
A is a IND-IK-CCA attacker against the public-key scheme. When A makes
decryption queries on ciphertexts of the form (vk,c,σ), it speciﬁes whether
it wants the decryption corresponding to PK 0 or PK 1. B answers decryption
queries as follows.
– If vk = vk
∗ then B checks whether Vrfy(vk
∗,c,σ)=1 .I nt h i sc a s e ,B does
not know the corresponding IBE secret key corresponding to the identity vk
∗
and it is not allowed to make this query to its Challenger C.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
B aborts and outputs a random bit. If Vrfy(vk
∗,c,σ)  =1t h e nB responds
with ⊥.
– If vk  = vk
∗ and Vrfy(vk,c,σ)  =1t h e nB responds with ⊥.
– If vk  = vk
∗ and Vrfy(vk,c,σ)=1t h e nB,
• Makes the oracle query KeyDer(tai,vk)w h e r ePK i i ss p e c i ﬁ e di nt h e
challenge query and obtains uskvk,tai.
• Computes m = Dec (mpktai,uskvk,tai,c) and responds with m.
At some point during the simulation A outputs two equal length messages
m0 and m1. B forwards (ta0,m0)a n d( ta1,m1) to its Challenger. B is given the
challenge ciphertext c∗ = Enc (mpktab,id
∗,m b). B computes σ∗ = Sgn(sk
∗,c ∗)
and gives A (vk
∗,c ∗,σ∗).
A continues to make decryption oracle queries which are answered by B as
before.
Finally A outputs a guess b  and this same guess is output by B and B wins
if b  = b.W en o t et h a tB provides a perfect simulation for A as well as a legal
strategy for attacking the IBE scheme. In particular it never requests the secret
key corresponding to the target identity vk
∗ for either of the target TAs.
Therefore we have
|PrB,Π [Succ] − 1
2| = |PrA,Π[Succ ∧ Forge]+1
2 · PrA,Π[Forge] − 1
2|.Building Key-Private Public-Key Encryption Schemes 285
Claim 2 then follows as we know the left hand side of the above equation is
negligible by the assumed security of the IBE scheme.
Finally, we have
|PrA,Π[Succ] − 1
2|
≤|PrA,Π[Succ ∧ Forge] − 1
2 · PrA,Π[Forge]|
+|PrA,Π[Succ ∧ Forge]+1
2 PrA,Π[Forge] − 1
2|
≤ 1
2 · PrA,Π[Forge]+|PrA,Π[Succ ∧ Forge]+1
2 PrA,Π[Forge] − 1
2|.
The proof of the result follows from the proofs of claims 1 and 2.
7 Anonymity of Standard Model IBE Schemes
To obtain a standard-model-secure key-private PKE scheme by applying the
CHK transform, we need a multi-TA IBE scheme that is suitably TA anonymous
under chosen plaintext attacks, in the standard model. While the TA anonymity
of multi-TA versions of some popular IBE schemes in the Random Oracle Model
has been previously studied in [21], the TA anonymity of multi-TA versions of
standard model IBE schemes has not as yet been investigated.
A multi-TA version of the BB1 IBE scheme from [5] can be sketched similar
to the multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme in section 7.1
We can easily show that such a multi-TA BB1 scheme is not TA anonymous.
Let us consider an adversary that requests the encryption of a message m to
identity id in either ta0 or ta1, in its challenge. The challenge ciphertext it
receives is of the form:
c∗ =( ˆ e(g1,g 2)s · m,gs,F(id)s)=( A,B,C).
Since
paramsta0 =( params,g 1,g 2, ˆ e(g1,g 2),h,F)
and
paramsta1 =( params,g 
1,g 
2, ˆ e(g 
1,g 
2),h  ,F )
the adversary simply checks if
ˆ e(B,g1id · h)=ˆ e(C,g)o rˆ e(B,g 
1
id · h )=ˆ e(C,g)
to ﬁnd, with overwhelming probability, which TA’s parameters were used.
Multi-TA analogues of schemes related to the BB1 scheme, such as those of
Waters [24] and Naccache [19], as well as the multi-TA analogue of the BB2
scheme [5], are also not TA anonymous for similar reasons.
The original scheme by Gentry [15] is recipient anonymous and we now show
that a multi-TA version of this scheme is TA anonymous.286 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
7.1 Multi-TA Gentry
We ﬁrst sketch a multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme. We assume identities
are elements in Z∗
p and messages are elements in GT. Later, we will need identities
that are bit-strings of a ﬁxed length; such identities can easily and securely be
converted into elements of Z∗
p by applying a suitable collision-resistant hash
function.
CommonSetup(1
k):
– (G,GT,e,p,g) ← PairingGen(1
k).
– Output params =( G,GT,e,p,g).
TASetup(params):
– Pick α
$ ← Z
∗
p.S e tg1 = g
α.
– Pick h
$ ← G.
– Deﬁne function
F : Z
∗
p → G st F(x)=g1 · g
−x.
– Set mpk =
(params,g 1,h,e(g,g),e(g,h),F).
– Set msk = α.
– Output (mpk,msk).
KeyDer(ta,id):
– Pick rid
$ ← Z
∗
p.
– Output uskta,id =( rid,hid)
where hid =( h · g
−rid)
1
α−id.
Enc(ta,id,m):
– Pick s
$ ← Z
∗
p.
– Output c =
(F(id)
s,e(g,g)
s,e(g,h)
−s · m).
Dec(ta,id,c):
– Parse c as (u,v,w).
– Parse uskta,id as (d0,d 1).
– Output m = w · e(u,hid)v
rid.
The Multi-TA Gentry scheme.
Anonymity of Multi-TA Gentry: We will ﬁrst show that the multi-TA ver-
sion of Gentry’s IBE scheme meets the r-m-IND-RA-TAA-CPA security notion
under the q-TDABDHE assumption. This gives us a reduction that has tightness
similar to the original single-TA scheme. Our proof follows closely the proof of
[15] with suitable modiﬁcations to reﬂect the multi-TA setting.
Theorem 2. Let q = qid +1where qid is the maximum number of private
key extraction queries allowed by the adversary per TA. Assume the (t, ,q)-
TDABDHE assumption holds in (G,GT). Then, the above multi-TA IBE scheme
is (t ,   ,q id) r-m-IND-RA-TAA-CPA secure for t  = t − O(texp · n · q2) and
   =   +( 4 /p) where texp is the time required to exponentiate in G.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
The above proof can be modiﬁed slightly to enable B to respond to Corrupt
queries as well, thereby giving us a proof of security for the m-IND-RA-TAA-
CPA security for the multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme, under the same
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Theorem 3. Let q = qid +1where qid is the maximum number of private
key extraction queries allowed by the adversary per TA. Assume the (t, ,q)-
TDABDHE assumption holds in (G,GT). Then, the above multi-TA IBE scheme
is (t ,   ,q id) m-IND-RA-TAA-CPA secure for t  = t − O(texp · n · q2) and
   =(   +( 4 /p)) ·
n
2

where texp i st h et i m er e q u i r e dt oe x p o n e n t i a t ei nG.
Proof. B simply generates two related q-TDABDHE challenges from the original
input challenge and uses these to respond to private key extraction queries for
two speciﬁc TAs indexed by tax,tay ∈T. It cannot respond to Corrupt queries
on these two TAs and the success of the proof relies on A choosing these two
TAs in its Challenge query (thereby reducing the tightness of the reduction).
F o ra l lo t h e rT A s{tai ∈ T : i  = x,i  = y}, B simply generates the master
public-keys and master secret keys itself and can therefore respond to private
key extraction and Corrupt queries on these TAs. Further details are similar to
the proof of Theorem 2.
Final Observations: The multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme that we
have given meets stronger notions of security than those required for the appli-
cation of Theorem 1. We can therefore instantiate the modiﬁed CHK transform
with the multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme (and any strongly secure one-
time signature scheme) to obtain an IND-IK-CCA PKE scheme. This scheme is
quite eﬃcient. Ciphertexts consist of 3 group elements plus a signature and a
veriﬁcation key from the one-time signature scheme. Encryption and decryption
cost roughly the same as encryption and decryption in Gentry’s scheme, with
the additional requirement of generating or verifying one-time signatures.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown that the key-privacy of the PKE scheme resulting from the appli-
cation of the CHK transform follows from the TA anonymity of the underlying
IBE scheme, giving us the ﬁrst generic method to construct a key-private PKE
scheme. We have investigated various IBE schemes in the standard model and
shown that a multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme meets the notion of TA
anonymity. We have also constructed a key-private PKE scheme by instantiating
the CHK transform with the multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme.
We believe that the relatively new notion of TA anonymity in the setting of
multiple TAs has rather subtle cryptographic implications on schemes that use
IBE as a building block, but these have not been studied rigorously. For example,
Holt [16] also considered security of IBE in the multi-TA setting, motivated by
earlier work on anonymous credential systems [17,9]. However, the TA anonymity
requirements for these applications are yet to be formally investigated.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let A be an adversary that (t ,   ,q id) breaks the r-m-IND-RA-TAA-CPA
security of the multi-TA Gentry IBE scheme described. Here qid is the maximum
number of private key extraction queries allowed by the adversary per TA. We
construct an algorithm B that solves the q-TDABDHE problem, as follows.
B takes as input a random q-TDABDHE challenge (g ,g 
q+2,g 1,g 2,...,g q,Z)
where Z is either e(gq+1,g ) or a random element of GT and the expected addi-
tional inputs (G,GT,e,p,g). (Recall that gi = g(α
i).)
Algorithm B proceeds as follows.
For an n TA system, T = {tai :1≤ i ≤ n} represents the set of (labels
of) TAs, where n = n(k) ∈ N. B uses the input challenge to generate n re-
lated q-TDABDHE challenges, one for each TA in T .L e tCHALi denote the
q-TDABDHE corresponding to tai ∈T.
For tai ∈T, B ﬁrst draws βi
$ ← Z∗
p and sets CHALi equal to:
(g
 ,g
 
q+2
(βi
(q+2)),g 1
(βi),g 2
(βi
2),...,g q
(βi
q),Z
(βi
(q+1)))290 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
or
(g ,g ((αβi)
q+2),g((αβi)),g((αβi)
2),...,g((αβi)
q),Z(βi
(q+1))).
We make a few important observations. Firstly, note that if Z = e(gq+1,g )
then Z(βi
(q+1)) is the correct response for the corresponding input challenge
CHALi. That is, if the original input q-TDABDHE challenge is drawn from
PABDHE, then so are all the CHALis. Similarly, if Z is random in GT then
so is Z(βi
(q+1)), i.e. if the original challenge is drawn from RABDHE then so are
all the CHALis.
Secondly, we note that the g  value is the same in all the n “related” challenges.
This does not present a problem as g  is used only once to construct the challenge
ciphertext.
– CommonSetup: B sets params equal to (G,GT,e,p,g).
– Setup: For each tai ∈T, B generates a random polynomial fi(x) ∈ Zp[x]o f
degree q.I ts e t shi = gfi(αβi), computing hi from g,g1
(βi),g 2
(βi
2),...,g q
(βi
q).
It sets the public-key for tai to mpki =( params,g 1
(βi),h i,e(g,g),e(g,hi),F i)
where Fi : Z∗
p → G is such that Fi(x)=g1
βi · g−x and sends all the n
master public-keys to A.S i n c eg,α are uniformly random, the βi values and
the polynomials fi(x) are chosen uniformly at random, the g1
(βi) and hi
values are also uniformly random. Therefore the master public-keys have a
distribution identical to that in an actual construction. (At this stage, we
have essentially succeeded in using the single q-TDABDHE challenge to set
up n independent TAs.)
–P h a s e1 : A makes key generation queries on (ta,id). B responds to a query
on ta = tai ∈T and id ∈ Z∗
p as follows.
B checks if gid = gαβj in each CHALj. If the equality holds, this implies that
id = αβj and B uses αβj to solve the q-TDABDHE challenge immediately
by computing the target response to the challenge itself.
Else, let Fid,i(x)d e n o t et h eq − 1 degree polynomial
Fid,i(x)=( fi(x) − fi(id))/(x − id).
B sets the private key for id in tai to
(rid,i,h id,i)=( fi(id),gFid,i(αβi)).
This is a valid private key since gFid,i(αβi) =( hi · g−fi(id))1/(αβi−id).
– Challenge: A outputs TAs ta0,ta1 (which correspond to tax and tay ∈T
respectively), identities id0,id1 and messages m0,m1.
Again, as in phase 1, B checks if either of gid 0 or gid 1 is equal to gαβj in
each CHALj. If the equality holds, this implies that one of id0 or id1 is equal
to αβj and B uses αβj to solve the q-TDABDHE challenge immediately by
computing the target response to the challenge itself.
Else, B generates a bit b ∈{ 0,1} and computes a private key didb,x =
(ridb,x,h idb,x)f o ridb in tax if b =0o rdidb,y =( ridb,y,h idb,y)f o ridb in tay
if b = 1 as in Phase 1.Building Key-Private Public-Key Encryption Schemes 291
Now, let g2(x)=x(q+2) and F2,idb(x)=( g2(x) − g2(idb))/(x − idb)w h i c hi s
a( q + 1) degree polynomial. Then F2,idb(x) can be written as
F2,idb(x)=
q+1 
i=0
F2,idb,i · xi = xq+1 +
q 
i=0
F2,idb,i · xi
where F2,idb,i is the coeﬃcient of xi in F2,idb(x).
B sets the ciphertext c =( u,v,w) as follows. In the following β = βx corre-
sponding to tax if b =0o rβ = βy corresponding to tay if b =1 .
B sets u = g (g2(αβ)−g2(idb)), v = Z(β
(q+1)) · e(g ,
q
i=0 gF2,idb,i·(αβ)
i
)
and w = m0/(ˆ e(u,hid0,x) · vrid0,x)i fb =0a n dw = m1/(ˆ e(u,hid1,y) · vrid1,y)
if b =1 .
To see that c =( u,v,w) is a valid and appropriately distributed ciphertext
when Z = e(gq+1,g ), ﬁrst let s =l o g g(g ) · F2,idb(αβ).
Note that s is uniformly random as logg(g ) is uniformly random and the βi
values are chosen uniformly at random. We will show that c is constructed
using “implicit” randomness s.N o w
g  = gs/(F2,idb(αβ)) = g(s(αβ−idb))/(g2(αβ)−g2(idb)).
Therefore, u = gs(αβ−idb). If Z is a random element in GT then v is random
in GT. On the other hand, if Z = e(gq+1,g ), then v = e(g,g)s since it can
be shown that
e(g
 ,
q 
i=0
g
F2,idb,i·(αβ)
i
)=e(g
 ,g
F2,idb(αβ)−(αβ)
q+1
)
and therefore, it can be shown that
v = Z(β
(q+1)) · e(g ,
q 
i=0
gF2,idb,i(αβ)
i
)=e(g,g)s.
Finally, note that for any private key didb,i =( ridb,i,h idb,i) corresponding to
tai ∈T,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
e(u,hidb,i) · v
ridb,i = e(g,hi)
s.
Therefore, w = mb · e(g,hx)−s if b =0a n dw = mb · e(g,hy)−s if b =1 .
–P h a s e2 :A continues to make key extraction queries and B responds as in
Phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b  ∈{ 0,1}.I fb = b  then B
outputs 0 indicating that Z = e(gq+1,g ); otherwise, it outputs 1.292 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
We have already shown that the public-keys and ciphertexts are appropriately
distributed. We now show that the private keys issued by B are appropriately
distributed as well. If Ii denotes the set consisting of αβi,idb and all the identities
queried by A for tai then |Ii|≤(q +1) .Then,f romA’s view the values {fi(a):
a ∈ I} are uniformly random and independent and this follows from the fact
that fi(x) is a uniformly random polynomial of degree q.
Probability Analysis: As we have already seen, if Z = e(g(q+1),g ), then the
simulation is perfect and A will guess the bit b with probability (1/2) +   .
On the other hand, if Z is a random element in GT then, u,v are uniformly
random and independent elements in G,GT respectively. It remains to reason
about w.
Now, w = mb/(ˆ e(u,hidb,i) · vridb,i)w h e r ei is x or y corresponding to tax or
tay. The value in the denominator can be expressed as follows:
e(u,hidb,i) · vridb,i = e(u,hi)1/(αβi−idb) · (v/e(u,g)1/(αβi−idb))fi(idb).
Now fi(idb) is independent of A’s view. Therefore as long as the inequalities
v  = e(u,g)1/(αβx−id0), v  = e(u,g)1/(αβx−id1) and v  = e(u,g)1/(αβy−id0), v  =
e(u,g)1/(αβy−id1) hold (and they hold with probability (1 − 4/p)), the value
e(u,hidb,i) · vridb,i is random and independent of A’s view. Consequently the
value w is random and independent of A’s view. This implies that if Z is a
random element then (u,v,w) can impart no information regarding the bit b.
Assuming that no queried identity equals αβj such that gαβj is in one of the
challenges CHALj, (which would only increase B’s success probability), we can
see that:

 Pr(B(g ,g 
(q+2),g 1,g 2,...,g q,e(g(q+1),g ),Z)=1 )− 1/2

  ≤ (4/p)
when (g ,g 
(q+2),g 1,g 2,...,g q,e(g(q+1),g ),Z) is sampled from RABDHE.
However,
 
Pr(B(g ,g 
(q+2),g 1,g 2,...,g q,e(g(q+1),g ),Z)=1 )− 1/2
 
 ≥   
when (g ,g 
(q+2),g 1,g 2,...,g q,e(g(q+1),g ),Z) is sampled from PABDHE.
Thus, for uniformly random g,g ,α,Z we have:
|Pr(B(g ,g 
(l+2),g 1,g 2,...,g l,e(g(l+1),g ))
−Pr(A(g ,g 
(l+2),g 1,g 2,...,g l,Z)|≥   − (4/p).
Time-Complexity: In the simulation, B’s overhead is dominated by computing
gFid,i(αβi) in response to A’s key generation query on identity id for tai ∈T,
where Fid,i(x) is a polynomial of degree (q−1). Each such computation requires
O(q) exponentiations in G.S i n c eA makes at most (q −1) such queries for each
TA, t = t  + O(texp · n · q2).